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ARE THERE CONSTITUTIONALLY
GUARANTEED LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL CODE PROCEEDINGS?
By LESLIE KATZ*
The courts of the province of Quebec conduct most of their business in
the French language. Section 133 of the British North America Act,1 how-
ever, provides in part,
Either the English or the French language ... may be used by any Person ... in
... any of the Courts of Quebec.
The courts of the provinces other than Quebec conduct most of their
business in the English language. In the prairie provinces, however, it appears
that there remain in force legislative provisions enacted by Parliament shortly
after Confederation which form part of the constitutions of those provinces
and which confer the same right on witnesses in their courts as does the
portion of s.133 quoted regarding witnesses in Quebec courts.2
What is the nature of this right? It cannot be merely the right to answer
questions as a witness in either English or French, which answers will then
be translated into the language which the court normally uses. It must be
the right to have the court before which the witness is testifying understand
him directly, without the intervention of an interpreter. Thus the provisions
must implicitly require courts capable of understanding both English and
French.3
Let us assume that this constitutional right were repealed by the four
provinces concerned as an exercise of their legislative authority to amend
their own constitutions 4 or that the other six provinces amended their con-
stitutions so as to include a provision restricting the right of witnesses before
* Member of the Manitoba Bar, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney,
Sydney, Australia.
1 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3(U.K.).
2 As to the constitutions of Alberta and Saskatchewan, see the Report of the Royal
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Vol. I, at 52, which refers to a federal
statute of 1877 incorporated by reference into the constitutions of these two provinces
when they were created in 1905. As to the constitution of Manitoba, a comparison of
the wording of the Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c.3, s.23, and the Official Language Act,
R.S.M. 1970, c.0-10, indicates that the latter statutes ancestor of 1890 did not attempt
to remove the right of witnesses to use French orally in proceedings in provincial courts.
3 See Miller & Kyling v. The Queen (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 785 (S.C.C.). Quare,
whether this requirement also implicitly includes juries or merely refers to judges.
4 Section 92(1) of the B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (U.K.), would pre-
sumably allow this. As to Quebec's legislative authority in this matter, see the views
of the Gendron Commission as reported in Le Devoir, February 14, 1973 at 18. In
1890, the Manitoba legislature repealed the constitutional right to use French in docu-
ments in provincial courts. See the Official Language Act, R.S.M. 1970, c.0-10.
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their courts to the use of one language only.5 Could Parliament impose or,
in some cases, reimpose on those courts the duty to allow witnesses to testify
in either English or French?
It might be possible for Parliament to do so as an exercise of its general
power, if it were held that the matter of the language rights of witnesses in
provincial courts, though traditionally a matter for the provinces, had achieved
national importance.6
In the absence of this holding, it might be argued that Parliament had
the authority to deal with the matter, at least insofar as it concerned federal
proceedings in provincial courts, as an exercise of its power to legislate in
respect of procedure in federal matters heard in provincial courts.7 But would
federal legislation of this sort be procedural in essence or would it rather be
legislation in relation to the constitutions of the provinces or in relation to
the constitution of their courts?8 Since the conferring of language rights on
witnesses in court proceedings necessarily imposes duties on those courts
which may require a change in the nature of the people presiding in them,
the question is a difficult one.9
Furthermore, Parliament is confronted by the prohibition against its
amending "the Constitution of Canada... as regards the use of the English
or French language . . .".1 This prohibition's meaning is obscure, though, if
it could divined, it might be found to prevent legislation of the sort suggested
above. The B.N.A. Act, in s.133, now provides for the use of either English
or French by witnesses in federal courts and it could be argued that to extend
this right to witnesses in federal matters before provincial courts would
amount to an amendment of "the Constitution of Canada."
5See The Judicature Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.228, s. 127. Quare, whether this provision
is a part of the province's "Constitution".
6 This view of the matter was taken by Limerick, J.A., in Reference re Official
Languages Acts of Canada and New Brunswick (1973), 5 N.B.R. (2d) 653 at 674
(N.B.S.C., App. Div.).
7 See Reference re Official Languages Acts, id., upholding, on this basis, the Official
Languages Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.0-2, s.11. An appeal from this decision win be heard
by the Supreme Court of Canada, sub nom. Jones v. A.-G. Canada and A.-G. New
Brunswick. See Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin, January 12, 1973, at 3.
8 This latter matter is assigned to the provincial legislatures by s.92(14) of the
B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c.3 (U.K.).
0 If the argument against federal legislative authority is accepted, ss. 555-56 of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, regarding the linguistic abilities of jurors in Cri-
minal Code trials in Quebec and Manitoba may be ultra vires. But see R. v. Preusantanz,
[1936] 2 D.L.R. 421 (Man. C.A.). If the argument is rejected, the following argument
in this note will have been unnecessary unless the federal Official Languages Act were
repealed.
10 Section 91(1) of the B.N.A. Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3(U.K.).
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In the face of these obstacles to Parliament's legislating on language
fights of witnesses in provincial courts, obstacles which may ultimately be
found by the courts to be insurmountable, is there any way the result desired
by Parliament can be obtained, assuming uncooperative provincial legisla-
tures? It is submitted that, at least in respect of Criminal Code proceedings
in the provincial courts,"1 there is an argument that can be made which
would lead to the desired result. The argument does not depend on federal
language legislation, but on a willingness on the part of the courts to make
inferences from legislation of long standing, inferences of the sort they have
previously been prepared to make.12
The argument has three parts: first, that Parliament can create federal,
criminal courts; secondly, that as was mentioned above, s.133 of the B.N.A.
Act provides,
Either the English or the French language ... may be used by any Person... in
... any Court of Canada established under this Act...
The third part is that Parliament, in conferring jurisdiction to hear trials
of charges under the Criminal Code on provincial courts, has transformed
them for the purpose of exercising that jurisdiction into federal criminal courts
so that the portion of s.133 just quoted is applicable in them.
First, can Parliament create federal criminal courts? Section 92(14) of
the B.N.A. Act enables the provincial legislatures "exclusively" to make laws
in relation to "the Constitution ... of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of
Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those
Courts." Does this provision looked at in isolation indicate an intention to
repose in the provinces the exclusive power to create criminal courts? I sub-
mit that it does not. It only confers on the provinces the exclusive authority
to create provincial courts, which courts are to be capable of exercising both
civil and criminal jurisdiction. This in no way detracts from any potential
Parliamentary power to create federal courts of criminal jurisdiction. The
exercise of such an authority would in no way render the provincial authority
nugatory, since the provinces would still be the only level capable of creating
provincial courts.
What is the source of the Parliamentary authority to create federal
criminal courts? It is s.101, which enables Parliament to provide "for the
Establishment of any additional Courts for the better administration of the
11 The Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, confers jurisdiction on provincial courts. See s.2.
12 The numbers of people of French mother tongue outside Quebec and of English
mother tongue inside Quebec are almost equal. There are just less than 800,000 in each
group. Statistics Canada, News Release on Census '71, April 24, 1972, at 3. All of these
persons, those most likely to require the right for which I argue, would be aided by my
argument if the provincial position ultimately prevails.
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Laws of Canada.' 3 Should the above interpretation of s.92(14) be incorrect
and that provision be properly interpreted in isolation as intending to confer
the authority to create all criminal courts on the provinces alone, its force
would be overcome by that of s.101, which not only appears later in the
statute, but, vastly more importantly, contains a non obstante clause.
It has been argued that s.91(27) in some way resolves this question
on the side of the provinces, guaranteeing them exclusive authority to create
criminal courts.14 I would submit that this argument is misconceived. Section
91(27) provides
... ([Nlotwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority
of... Parliament... extends to ... The Criminal Law, except the Constitution
of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction...
It is submitted that this provision merely amounts to a recognition that
Parliament's authority to create criminal courts is not exclusive. It does not
imply that Parliament has no such power at all.
The view expressed above regarding Parliament's authority to create
federal criminal courts has commended itself to courts,15 commentators 6 and,
indeed, to Parliament itself..7 As Taschereau, J., said in Valin v. Langlois,'8
The constitution, maintenance and organization of Provincial Courts of criminal
jurisdiction is given to the Provincial Legislatures ... yet, cannot Parliament, in
13 It is interesting to speculate on the possibility that there is a difference in the
meaning of the phrase "provide . . . for the Establishment of . . . Courts" in s.101 and
the phrase "make laws in relation to . . . The Constitution . . . of . . . Courts" in
s.92(14). Section 101 itself may suggest this. It declares that, with respect to "a Gen-
eral Court of Appeal for Canada," "Parliament... may... provide for... [its] ...
Constitution," -but that with respect to "Courts for the better Administration of the
Laws of Canada," "Parliament may provide for ... [their] ... Establishment." The
difficulty with this suggestion of a difference in meaning is that if "establishment" is
not synonymous with "constitution", what can "establishment" mean? Presumably, the
phrases are synonymous with each other and both connote the ability to create courts.
See, e.g., the usage of "constitute" and "establish" in the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (3d. ed. rev. with addenda). In any event, no court, so far as I know, has
ever commented upon this curious difference in wording and, thus, s. 101 must be taken
to allow Parliament to create courts just as s. 92(14) permits the provincial legislatures
to create courts.
14 See McDonald, Constitutional Aspects of Canadian Anti-Combines Law En-
forcement (1969), 47 C.B.R. 161 at 220 ff.
15 See Valin v. Langlois (1880), 3 S.C.R. 1 at 75; R. v. Wipper (1902), 5 C.C.C.
17 (N.S.S.C.) and Ex p. Lebel (1910), 16 C.C.C. 363 (N.B.S.C.). There are contrary
dicta in two of the judgments in the Supreme Court of Canada in the Board of Com-
inerce case, but the point was not dealt with by the Judicial Committee on appeal.
See (1920), 60 S.C.R. 456, af'd., E1922] 1 A.C. 191. These dicta did not refer to the
comment in the Valin case or to the Lebel case (in which the ratio was that Parliament
could create federal criminal courts).
16 See Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (3d ed..rev. Toronto: Carswell Co.,
1969) at 818. Reference re Privy Council Appeals, [1947] A.C. 127 is relied on. See
particularly Lord Jowitt, L.C.'s comments in that case at 153.
17 See the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 65 (Item 9), in
which the Federal Court is constituted a criminal court for the purpose of certain
proceedings under the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
18 Valin v. Langlois, supra, note 15 at 75.
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virtue of s.101 of the Act, create new courts of criminal jurisdiction and enact
that all crimes, all offences shall be tried exclusively before these new courts? I
take this to be beyond controversy.
To proceed with the more difficult part of the argument now, it is con-
tended that any provincial court has been, when exercising jurisdiction under
the Criminal Code, thereby established as a court of Canada under s.101 of
the B.N.A. Act so as to render s.133 applicable therein.19 Authority for this
proposition is to be found primarily in the case of Valin v. Langlois, a por-
tion of which has just been quoted, a decision of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada. In that case it was held that Parliament, in conferring on provincial
courts the jurisdiction to try actions with respect to controverted federal elec-
tions, had thereby created, respecting the exercise of that jurisdiction, federal
courts.
Leave to appeal from this decision was denied by the Judicial Commit-
tee of the Privy Council.2 0 Lord Selborne, who delivered the opinion of the
Board on the application, stated2l that it had been suggested
... that it has seemed fit to the Parliament of Canada to confer the jurisdiction
necessary for the trial of election petitions upon Courts of ordinary jurisdiction
in the provinces, and it is said that although the Parliament of Canada might have
provided in any other manner for those trials, and might have created any new
Courts for this purpose, it could not commit the exercise of such a new jurisdic-
tion to any existing Provincial Court. After all their Lordships have heard ....
they are at a loss to follow that argument, even supposing that this were not in
truth and in substance the creation of a new Court.
Thus the Judicial Committee agreed with the Supreme Court of Canada
that, in conferring jurisdiction in federal election matters on provincial courts,
Parliament had created them federal courts for the purpose of exercising
such jurisdiction. It is submitted that, by using the method the Supreme
Court of Canada did in the Valin case, one could come to the conclusion that
in conferring jurisdiction in the Criminal Code on provincial courts, Par-
liament had thereby established them as federal courts under s.101 for the
purpose of exercising that jurisdiction, in which case the language guarantee
in s.133 would be applicable in them.
After all, let us note that the Criminal Code contains, as did the Elec-
tions Act in the view of Ritchie, C.J., in the Valin case, 22
all necessary and suitable provisions to enable them [the courts], and the judges
thereof, effectually to exercise such jurisdiction, not only with reference to the
principles, but also to the rules and practice by which they should be governed...
19 An argument of this sort was apparently made and rejected in Ex p. Poulin
(1968), 69 D.L.R. (2d) 526 (B.C.S.C.), affd. (1968), 1 D.L.R. (3d) 239 (B.C.C.A.).
The judgments, however, make no reference to the authorities which follow and so the
decision may have been made per incuriam in any event.
20 (1879), 5 App. Cas. 115.
21Id., at 119, emphasis added.
22 Valin v. Langlois, supra, note 15 at 30.
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In the case of the election courts, the Chief Justice continued,23
This is more especially noticable with reference to the enactments under the
headings "interpretation clauses," "procedure," "jurisdiction and rules of court,"
"reception and jurisdiction of the judge," "witnesses," and the provision as to who
may practice as agent or attorney, or as counsel in such courts in the case of such
petitions, and all matters relating thereto before the court or judge.
The Criminal Code as well contains parts or sections dealing wholly or
partly with all of the same matters.24 Therefore, the conclusion argued for
could reasonably be made.25
There are obviously difficulties with this argument which attempts to
resolve a conflict caused by the federal use of provincial courts merely by
elevating these courts above the struggle. Among them may be offered the
suggestion that the wording of the Official Languages Act, Parliament's own
attempt to resolve the problem of the language rights of witnesses in federal
proceedings in provincial courts, appears not to contemplate that the trans-
formation for which I have argued took place. In response to this, one might
argue the impossibility of interpreting the intention of Parliament in 1892,
when it first enacted the Code, by the use of legislation, perhaps ultra vires
in any event, which it enacted in 1969. Yet this response, and others to
further objections, do not in any way guarantee the acceptance of the argu-
ment, should it become necessary to make it. All that can be said is that if
it were necessary to make it, its acceptance would not require the breaking
of entirely new ground by the judiciary, that it would extend to all a right now
available only to some and that it would guarantee this rather meagre right
against provincial repeal.
2 3 Id., at 31-32.
24 See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, especially Parts I, XII through X
and XXIV.25 See also R. v. Wipper, supra, note 15, in which, relying on Valin v. Langlois,
supra, note 15, it was held that Parliament, in conferring jurisdiction on provincially
appointed justices of the peace to hear prosecutions under the Canada Temperance Act,
had thereby established them as federal courts under s. 101 of the B.N.A. Act for the
purpose of exercising that jurisdiction. See also a case comment by "B.L." (now Laskin,
J., of the Supreme Court of Canada?), (1945), 23 C.B.R. 159. "In The British Tradi-
tion in Canadian Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1969) at 114, the author, Laskin,
J. A. (as he then was), declared that "provincial courts . . . endowed with federaljurisdiction . . . may be considered, pro tanto, as federal courts in so far as they
administer federal law." If the argument I have made regarding the transformation
of courts were accepted and if it were accepted that s.133 of the B.N.A. contemplates
bilingual juries as well as courts, then the provisions of the Criminal Code referred to in
note 9, supra, regarding the linguistic abilities of jurors are ultra vires, not for the
reasons mentioned in the text accompanying note 9 but because they contravene s.91(I)
of the B.N.A. Act by impairing the rights conferred by s.133.
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